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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE ISSUES IN THIS
APPEAL IS CORRECTNESS, NOT ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Because the parties to this appeal disagree about the appropriate standard of review

for each of the Issues, Angel Investors, LLC (" Angel") has included in its Reply Brief
this more in-depth discussion of the standards of review.
A.
A Court's Grant of a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Without
Allowing Discovery is Reviewed for Correctness, Not Abuse of
Discretion
While the Defendants may be correct that the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion made
in response to a motion for summary judgment is reviewed using an abuse of discretion
standard, see Brief of Appellees at 3, this is not the appropriate standard of review when
the request for additional discovery is made in response to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss. Here, the appropriate standard is correctness. See Brief of Appellant at 1-2.
Although Angel's request for additional discovery was initially labeled as a motion
pursuant to Rule 56(f), the label a party uses to name its motion is not dispositive.
Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, f 6n.l, 122 P.3d 622. Rather, as discussed in more
detail below, the court considers the content and context of the motion in order to
determine the motion's true nature. See id. Here, the content and context of the motion
reveal that Angel's request for additional discovery was made in response to a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and was in fact
made so early in the litigation that no discovery had yet been conducted. See Brief of

1

Appellant, Addendum E at ^ 4-5. Thus, it is not appropriate to review the court's denial
of Angel's discovery request pursuant to the standards of Rule 56.
Instead, the standards of Rule 12(b)(1) must apply, and a dismissal pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness.
Canfield, 2005 UT 60 at ^f 6 n. 1. The essential consideration here is whether the district
court properly granted the motion to dismiss when it considered affidavits attached in
support of the motion but denied Angel the opportunity to conduct the discovery
necessary to rebut those affidavits. Without this discovery, Angel could not effectively
respond to the motion to dismiss.
The appropriate standard of review for this issue is not abuse of discretion, but
correctness.
B.

A Court's Determination of a Derivative Plaintiffs Standing under
Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 is Reviewed for Correctness

Although Angel and Defendants agree that the district court granted the motion to
dismiss because it determined that Angel lacked standing under Rule 23.1 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties disagree as to the standard of review that should be
applied to that determination. Compare Brief of Appellant at 1-2 (advocating a
correctness standard of review) with Brief of Appellees at 1-2 (advocating an abuse of
discretion standard of review). Utah law supports Angel's position.
Under Utah law, the determination of whether a derivative plaintiff has standing
under Rule 23.1 is primarily a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness, not
abuse of discretion. See LeVanger v. Highland Estates Properties Owners Assoc., 2003
2

UT App. 377, f 8, 80 P.3d 569 (reviewing a Rule 23.1 standing determination and stating
that the question of whether a party has standing is primarily a question of law); cf. Brief
of Appellees at 1-2 (relying on cases from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, as well as the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals). Even the district court in its Ruling recognized that "[t]he
determination of whether a party has standing 'is primarily a question of law, although
there may be factual findings that bear on the issue."' Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at
6 (quoting LeVanger, 2003 UT App. 377 at f 8).
In LeVanger, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the determination of a derivative
plaintiffs standing under Rule 23.1, and explained:
[T]he question of whether a given individual or association has standing to request
a particular relief is primarily a question of law, although there may be factual
findings that bear on the issue. We will review such factual determinations made
by a trial court with deference. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
Because of the important policy considerations involved in granting or denying
standing, we will closely review trial court determinations of whether a given set
of facts fits the legal requirements for standing, granting minimal discretion to the
trial court. Id. at 938, 939.
LeVanger, 2003 UT App. 377 at f 8 (quoting Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946
P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997)) (emphasis added).
Significantly, the standing determination being reviewed in LeVanger was made at
trial following an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing under Rule 23.1, LeVanger,
2003 UT App. 377 at f 6; the use of a less deferential standard of review is even more
essential where, as here, the standing determination was made early in the litigation
process, without any discovery, upon a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, Jones v. Barlow,
3

2007 UT 20, t 12, 154 P.3d 808, and a dismissal pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness, see Canfield, 2005 UT 60
at1f6n.l,t 10.
The appropriate standard of review for this issue is not abuse of discretion, but
correctness.
IL

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS WITHOUT ALLOWING ANGEL TIME TO CONDUCT
RELEVANT DISCOVERY
The district court granted the motion to dismiss without allowing Angel time to

conduct discovery because Angel's discovery request was identified as a Rule 56(f)
motion, and the court concluded that Rule 56 was inapplicable to Rule 12(b)(1) motions
to dismiss. See Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 3-4, 6. This denial of discovery was
error, however, because it was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. While it
is true that a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is not automatically converted into a summary
judgment motion simply because affidavits are attached, see Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002
UT 16, Tf 20, 40 P.3d 632, this principle does not foreclose a plaintiffs request for time to
conduct discovery.
In support of its position, Angel cited in its Brief Coombs v. Juice Works Dev. Inc.,
2003 UT App. 388, 81 P.3d 769, and Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d
1221 (10th Cir. 2001). Defendants challenge Angel's reliance on these cases, correctly
noting that because discovery was allowed in these cases, the courts did not reach the
issue of whether it would have been error to deny a request for discovery. See Brief of
Appellees at 40. But the fact that discovery was allowed in those cases is exactly the
4

point. Angel cited Coombs and Stuart because these cases establish that it is not
necessary to convert a Rule 12 motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion in
order to consider and ultimately grant a request for time to conduct discovery. Both
Coombs and Stuart involved motions to dismiss under Rule 12 which were not converted
into summary judgment motions, and yet in both cases, the courts allowed the parties to
conduct discovery before ruling on the motions to dismiss. Coombs, 2003 UT App. 388
atfflj7-8 (ruling on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss); Stuart, 271 F.3d at 1225 (ruling
on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss).
In the end, Defendants encourage this Court to exalt form over function when they
argue that the district court properly denied Angel's request for discovery simply because
it was labeled as a Rule 56(f) motion. This argument ignores the fact that the label a
party uses to name its motion is not dispositive; despite the parties' interpretation of a
motion, the court is free to consider both the content and context of the motion in order to
determine the motion's true nature. See Canfield v. Lay ton City, 2005 UT 60, ^f 6 n.l, 122
P.3d 622.
Moreover, the two cases relied upon by Defendants - Wheeler v. McPherson and
Spoons v. Lewis - simply do not support the position of Defendants or the district court.
In both cases, this Court upheld the denial of a plaintiff s Rule 56(f) discovery request
made in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss not because the request had been
made pursuant to Rule 56, but because in each case, the plaintiff had already conceded
the essential facts upon which the motion to dismiss was made. Thus, no discovery was
needed.
5

For example, in Wheeler, this Court made its holding clear when it stated,
'Therefore, because plaintiffs admit the very facts necessary to dispose of their
suit. . ., we rule that the district court did not err by denying plaintiffs' discovery
request." Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, t 2 0 , 40 P.3d 632 (emphasis added). And
in Spoons, this Court noted that the plaintiff had openly admitted the facts upon which the
motion to dismiss was based and then stated that under these circumstances, the plaintiff
"therefore cannot complain that the district court's treatment of the motion prevented
her from rebutting the evidence." Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, ^ 5, 987 P.2d 36
(emphasis added).
Unlike the plaintiffs in Wheeler and Spoons, however, Angel has not admitted the
essential facts upon which the Defendants' motion to dismiss was made, and the district
court's denial of Angel's motion for time to conduct discovery prevented Angel from
rebutting the evidence outside the pleadings which was considered by the court.
Defendants presented, and the district court considered, nineteen affidavits in support of
the motion to dismiss, and without the opportunity to conduct discovery or to create a
record of any kind, Angel was unable to rebut this evidence or "present by affidavit facts
essential to justify" its position. See Wheeler, 2002 UT 16 at \ 20.
In particular, Angel sought discovery regarding the basis for the testimony
provided in the nineteen affidavits, Brief of Appellant, Addendum E at ^f 7, the
knowledge of Defendants' misconduct by other minority interest owners, id. at f 8, the
percentage of ownership interest of each of the nineteen affiants, id. at ^f 10, and the
extent of ownership within the company, id. at ^f 14. As explained in Angel's opening
6

Brief and in greater detail below, these facts regarding the ownership interests and
motivations of the other Xango owners are relevant to the question of whether there are
any similarly situated minority owners, and this discovery would have revealed that
Angel is a "class of one." Thus the requested discovery was directly relevant to the issue
of whether Angel is a fair and adequate representative with standing under Rule 23.1.
The district court therefore committed reversible error when it granted the motion
to dismiss and considered evidence outside the pleadings without first allowing Angel to
conduct discovery necessary to rebut that evidence and effectively respond to the motion
to dismiss.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS BASED ON ITS DETERMINATION THAT ANGEL DID NOT
SATISFY THE "FAIR AND ADEQUATE REPRESENTATIVE"
REQUIREMENT OF RULE 23.1
The district court based its conclusion that Angel is not a fair and adequate

representative under Rule 23.1 on two grounds, both of which were improper grounds for
dismissal. First, the district court erred in concluding that Angel is not a "class of one"
and therefore cannot proceed as a derivative plaintiff without the support of other XanGo
members. Second, even if Angel is not a class of one and other XanGo members are
similarly situated to Angel, the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based
only on a purely hypothetical conflict between Angel's interests in the Direct Lawsuit and
its interests in the Derivative Lawsuit.

7

A.

The District Court Erred in Concluding that Angel is Not a Class of
One and Cannot Proceed Without the Support of Other XanGo
Members

The district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on the lack of
support for the derivative action from other Xango members. At the heart of this issue is
the question of what it means to be "similarly situated" as required by Rule 23.1.
According to Defendants and the district court, at least four of the other Xango minority
members are automatically similarly situated to Angel if they would benefit financially
from the Derivative Suit1. See Brief of Appellee at 17-23; Brief of Appellant, Addendum
A at 7, 11. This is an erroneous - and ultimately unfair - interpretation of Rule 23.1.

1

Defendants allege that Angel mischaracterized the district court's Ruling
when it said that the district court "eliminated" from its consideration any affidavits filed
by the Defendants, relatives of the Defendants, or employees of XanGo. Brief of
Appellees at 17-18 (arguing that the district court did not "eliminate" any particular
XanGo member and actually held that "even i f these affiants are excluded, "at least"
four other XanGo members are similarly situated to Angel). This is a matter of
semantics.
In its Ruling, the district court stated:
In this case, the evidence before the court shows that six of the nineteen affiants
are the Defendants and two have a family relationship with a Defendant. As of
September 30, 2006, the Defendants owned 86.1% of XanGo. Seven other affiants
are employees of XanGo. Only four of the affiants do not have an employee or
family relationship to the Defendants or the company of which Defendants are
majority owners. While Defendants, their family members, and the XanGo
employees may not be similarly situated to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the
four remaining affiants are similarly situated to Plaintiff.
Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 11 (emphasis added). Whether or not the district court
formally "eliminated" any particular XanGo member from its consideration is irrelevant;
the fact remains that the district court chose not to include the Defendants, relatives of the
Defendants, and employees of XanGo in its finding of similarly situated XanGo
members.
8

In reality, the determination of whether shareholders or members are similarly
situated is much broader than that, incorporating other considerations such as the
characteristics of the shareholders' or members' ownership interests, voting rights,
management status, relationships with the defendants or current management, and
motivations for opposing the derivative suit.
Defendants allege that the cases upon with Angel relies, such as Jordon v.
Bowman Apple Prods. Co. and Larson v. Dumke, actually support Defendants' limited
definition of "similarly situated" rather than Angel's broader considerations. See Brief of
Appellees at 18. This is not true. Neither Jordon nor Larson supports the position that a
"similarly situated" determination is based solely on who would benefit from the
derivative claims.
In Jordon the court considered the other shareholders' ownership interests and
voting rights in determining whether any shareholders were similarly situated to the
derivative plaintiff. While the derivative plaintiff in Jordon may (or may not) have been
the only party who would benefit from the derivative claims, the court did not rely on or
even mention this criteria when it determined that the derivative plaintiff had standing as
a "class of one" under Rule 23.1. Instead, the court in Jordon emphasized that in a case
such as the case before it where oppression and mismanagement were alleged, the
existence of any stock voting arrangement which alters the power structure of the
corporation is "[c]learly important." Jordon v. Bowman Apple Prods. Co., 728 F. Supp.
409, 413 (W.D. Va. 1990). Because the derivative plaintiff in that case was the only
shareholder who had not entered into a voting-trust agreement which gave voting control
9

of the stock to the corporate president, the court concluded that no other shareholders
were similarly situated and the derivative plaintiff was a legitimate class of one. Id.
More important, in Larson, the court considered the other shareholders'
relationship with the defendants as well as their motivation in opposing the derivative
suit. While the derivative plaintiff in Larson may (or may not) have been the only party
who would benefit from the derivative claims, the court did not rely on or even mention
this criteria when it determined that the derivative plaintiff had standing as a "class of
one" under Rule 23.1. Instead, the court emphasized that in that case, the non-defendant
shareholders were not similarly situated with the derivative plaintiff because they had an
economic interest in supporting the current management and because their opposition to
the derivative suit may have been "motivated by individual interests, rather than the good
of the corporation." Larson v. Durnke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990).
Angel's situation is strikingly similar to the situations in Jordon and Larson. Here,
the district court found that four XanGo minority members were similarly situated to
Angel, and all but one of those members have entered into an operating agreement which
Angel alleges (in the Direct Suit) has been used to oppress Angel and mismanage
corporate assets. R.238 at 7-8. Some members, such as the Grimmers, also have a board
position and special status with some management control, while another, the Bederra
Group, has economic status as a XanGo vendor. R.238 at 7-8.
While Genesis Group has allegedly not signed the 2005 Amended and Restated
Operating Agreement, it is not similarly situated to Angel because it has indicated its
desire, along with the other minority owners, to allow the misfeasance in the company to
10

continue in perpetuity. Moreover, Genesis Group was once a supporter of Angels' efforts
and actually helped finance the Direct Lawsuit before being threatened by XanGo.
R.211-12, ff6-7. Genesis Group apparently changed its mind with regard to the
derivative action and the Direct Lawsuit when it signed an affidavit stating that it did not
agree with the legal actions being taken by Angel. Angel was prevented from exploring
through discovery Genesis' reasons for now disagreeing with the actions Angel has taken
to enforce its minority interests. Angel should have been given the chance to conduct
discovery on these material facts. As a result, each of these XanGo members has a shared
economic interest with the Defendants and thus a personal motivation for opposing the
Derivative Suit.
Despite Defendants' assertions to the contrary, this situation is not similar to that
in Smith v. Ayres, where the court held the plaintiff could not proceed as a class of one
because the other owners opposing the derivative action "simply fundamentally
disagree[d] with [the proposed derivative plaintiff] on what is good for the corporation."
977 F.3d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1992). Here, the XanGo members who oppose the Derivative
Suit do so not because of a fundamental disagreement with Angel about what is best for
the company, but because of their desire to protect their own economic interests. It would
be in the company's best interests to put an end to the malfeasance, but as the district
court noted in its Ruling, the affidavits submitted by the other XanGo members indicate
that the other members "have clearly determined that even if the alleged malfeasance is

11

occurring, they prefer to allow its continuance rather than allow XanGo to be involved in
a derivative lawsuit."2 Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 11.
Because the other XanGo members are motivated by their own interests and
willing to go along with the controlling members' malfeasance, they are not similarly
situated to Angel and it would not be in XanGo's best interests to require Angel to fairly
and adequately represent them. See Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., 420 F. Supp. 226, 231
(E.D. Pa. 1976) ("[T]here are no other shareholders who are 'similarly situated,' viz.,
shareholders who are dissatisfied with the actions of the officers and directors of [the
corporation]."); see also Brandon v. Brandon Constr. Co., 776 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Ark.
1989) ("The mere fact that the other shareholders were willing to go along with a
violation of the rights of the corporation did not foreclose the [plaintiff] from maintaining
her action.").
Angel is unique because of its continued opposition to the operating agreement,
because it alone has no economic interest in supporting the Defendants or current XanGo
management, and because it alone wants to put a stop to the XanGo management's
malfeasance. If Angel cannot proceed as the derivative plaintiff in this action, XanGo

2

In their Statement of Fact \ 8, Defendants quote this relevant language from
each affidavit. Brief of Appellees at 9. Notably, Defendants acknowledge that this
language is nearly identical in eighteen of the nineteen affidavits, which only strengthens
Angel's argument that it must be allowed to proceed as a class of one. Eighteen separate
affiants would not just spontaneously choose the same language to express their opinions
regarding the Derivative Suit, and this similarity in the affidavits only supports Angel's
suspicions that the other Xango members are being controlled or influenced in some way
by Xango management. There is obviously some entanglement here which Angel should
have been allowed to discover.
12

will be left without a remedy. See Halsted Video, Inc. v. Guttillo, 115 F.R.D. 177, 180
(N.D. 111. 1987) (concluding that the derivative plaintiff could proceed as a class of one
and noting that to accept defendants' argument to the contrary would leave not only the
derivative plaintiff but also the company without a remedy for the defendants' alleged
misconduct); Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn, 796 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1990) (discussing
this reasoning from Halsted).
As the only XanGo member seeking to protect the company's interests, Angel
should be allowed to proceed in the Derivative Suit as a class of one. To hold otherwise that is, to hold that a sole dissenting member cannot bring a derivative action on behalf of
the entity against the controlling members - would violate a significant principle of
corporate governance. For policy reasons, minority members must have the ability to
challenge oppressive and wrongful conduct on the part of the majority members,
regardless of how unpopular the suit may be from the perspective of other members.3

3

Defendants also attempt to draw this Court's attention to the fact that Angel
owns only 1 % of Xango in comparison to the nineteen remaining members, who own
99%. See Brief of Appellees at 33-34. It is deceiving to consider the ownership interests
of both the controlling members and the minority members together, however, and
separating the two groups reveals that the relevant ownership interests are not quite as
disparate as Defendants would make them seem.
As controlling members, the six Defendants alone account for at least 86 percent
of the Xango ownership. R.238 at vi; Brief of Appellant, Addendum E at \ 12. The
remaining thirteen minority members own only 14 percent of Xango, with respective
ownership percentages ranging from .10 percent to 3.3 percent. Brief of Appellant,
Addendum E at ^f 12. Thus, all of the minority members own percentages of XanGo
which are comparable to the 1 percent owned by Angel. There is no great disparity
between Angel's ownership percentage and the ownership percentages of those minority
members who oppose the Derivative Suit.
Furthermore, the cases relied on by Defendants do not support the argument that
the ownership percentage of those who oppose the derivative action is dispositive. For
13

The district court erred when it determined that Angel is not a fair and adequate
representative and cannot proceed as a class of one pursuant to Rule 23.1 and therefore
committed reversible error in granting the motion to dismiss on this ground.
B.

The District Court Erred in Determining that Angel is an Inadequate
Representative under Rule 23.1 Based on a Hypothetical Conflict

The district court erred in determining that Angel is an inadequate representative
and in granting the motion to dismiss because it failed to first find that an actual conflict
existed between Angel's interests in the Direct Suit and its interests in the Derivative Suit.
Although Defendants do not address the issue of this failure in their Appellees' Brief, this
failure is critical and requires that the district court's Ruling be reversed.
The law is clear that in order to dismiss a derivative plaintiff based on a conflict of
interest, the court must first find that the plaintiff has interests that are actually - not

example, while it is true that in Nolen 79 of the 84 stockholders (representing 96 percent
of the outstanding stock) opposed the derivative action, the Sixth Circuit recognized the
difficulty of applying a quantitative requirement to a Rule 23.1 standing determination
and expressly stated that it would not affirm on that ground. Nolen v. Shaw-Walker Co.,
449 F.2d 506, 508 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1971).
Kuzmickey is also distinguishable. In that case, the defendants and other minority
shareholders together owned 84 percent of the corporation (70 and 14 percent,
respectively), and the potential derivative plaintiff owned only 16 percent. Even though
the court in Kuzmickey found that the potential plaintiff was an inadequate representative
under Rule 23.1, it did so based on its erroneous conclusion that a derivative plaintiff
could not ever proceed as a class of one - not because of the plaintiffs relatively small
ownership. See Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., 420 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see
also Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn, 796 F. Supp. 160, 161-162 (Tex. 1990) (citing cases and
recognizing that more recent decisions have expressly rejected the Kuzmickey
interpretation of Rule 23.1). The Kuzmickey court found that no other shareholders were
similarly situated with the potential derivative plaintiff, and thus, under the correct
interpretation of Rule 23.1, the derivative action would not have been dismissed. The
plaintiff in Kuzmickey would have been allowed to proceed as a class of one, regardless of
its ownership percentage.
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merely potentially - antagonistic to the other shareholders in the derivative action.
Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983). Conflicts which are
merely hypothetical possibilities are insufficient to support dismissal of a derivative
action. G.A. Enterprises, Inc. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 517 F.2d 24, 27 (1st
Cir. 1975); Williams v. Service Corp. MI, 459 S.E.2d 621, 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999);
7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 1983; see In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities
Litig, 455 F. Supp. 999, 1014 (D.C. 111. 1978) (allowing a derivative plaintiff to proceed
where "at this stage of the proceedings there is merely a potential conflict of interest
present"). The district court itself even recognized in its Ruling that "[i]f only a potential
conflict is present, the cases may both proceed; the Court may take appropriate action if
an actual conflict arises." Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 9.
Despite the district court's recognition of this clear requirement, however, it
dismissed the Derivative Suit based only on a finding of a potential conflict. In its
Ruling, the district court found only that "there may be some actual conflict between
[Angel's] interest in the Direct Lawsuit and its representation in the derivative suit," and
even acknowledged that it is "possible" that Angel's participation in the Direct Suit will
not decrease its interest in pursuing the derivative claims. Brief of Appellant, Addendum
A at 9 (emphasis added). Because of this failure to find that an actual conflict of interest
exists, the district court's determination that Angel is an inadequate representative under
Rule 23.1 and dismissal of the Derivative Suit must be reversed. See Vanderbilt, 725
F.2d at 208-209 (reversing the dismissal of a derivative action based on a determination
that the plaintiff was an inadequate representative where the district court issued its order
15

without first finding that the plaintiffs interest were antagonistic to those of the other
shareholders).
Furthermore, even had the district court made such a finding, the dismissal of the
Derivative Suit would still be reversible error because there is no actual conflict of
interest. As Defendants recognize, there is no per se rule against simultaneous direct and
derivative actions, see in re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litig., 455 F. Supp. at
1014, and derivative claims seeking monetary damages on behalf of the corporation are
not incompatible with direct claims seeking dissolution of the corporation.
While the court in Neusteter v. District Court did not formally address the
requirements of Rule 23.1 in relation to the plaintiffs dissolution claim,4 the court
nevertheless offered helpful guidance explaining that derivative claims and claims for
dissolution do not create an unavoidable conflict of interest. The court explained that the
defendants' argument that derivative claims are "good" for the corporation while
dissolution claims are "bad" for the corporation "extends the anthropomorphic concept of
the corporation - a person capable of injury and knowledge - beyond the point of its
usefulness in solving problems involving corporate relationships." Neusteter, 675 P.2d 1,
8 (Colo. 1984). Instead, the court concluded that both remedies are ultimately directed at
protecting investments, and there is "no contradiction" between a plaintiffs derivative

4

The court did address the issue of fair and adequate representation under
Rule 23.1, however, analyzing whether the plaintiffs were required to adequately
represent the very persons charged with wrongdoing, or only the "similarly situated"
members of the allegedly wronged minority group. Neusteter, 675 P.2d at 7.
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action and concurrent claim for dissolution because of the prospect of continued
mismanagement of the corporation. Id.
GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Management, Ltd., also supports the position that there is no
conflict of interest between derivative claims and claims for dissolution. In that case, the
Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs allegations set forth a sufficient basis
- separate and apart from the derivative claims - for seeking judicial dissolution. GLFP,
2007 UT App. 131, f 13, 163 P.3d 636. While Defendants are correct that the court in
GLFP did not specifically address the issue of standing under Rule 23.1, the court did
reverse summary judgment on the dissolution claim and indicated that a derivative claim
for breach of fiduciary duty can co-exist with a direct claim for dissolution.5 GLFP, 2007
UTApp. 131 atffif12-13, 15.
Defendants urge this Court to rely upon Read v. Read, a Wisconsin case which
Defendants assert stands for the proposition that a conflict of interest exists when a
derivative plaintiff moves in a direct suit to dissolve the corporation. See Brief of
Appellees at 28. In Read, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did affirm the dismissal of a
derivative action where the derivative plaintiff also sought dissolution of the corporation.

5

This is particularly true in light of the fact that an appellate court can affirm
a district court's ruling for "any reason supported by the record," even if that reason
differs from the stated basis for the ruling below. See U.S. v. Hanson, 526 F.3d 653, 663
(10th Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Titan Indent. Co., 508 F.3d 971, 975 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007).
In GLFP, had the Utah Court of Appeals believed that a direct claim for
dissolution of a corporation is fundamentally incompatible with derivative claims, it was
free to affirm the dismissal of the dissolution claim on that ground. But it did not. It
elected instead to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on that claim.
GLFP, 2007 UT App. 13 l,fflj 12-13.
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The problem with relying on Read, however, is that the Wisconsin statute upon which the
court's reasoning is based differs significantly from Rule 23.1.
Under the Wisconsin statute, in order for a shareholder to have standing to bring a
derivative action, he or she must "[f]airly and adequately represent the interests of the
corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation." Read, 556 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Wis.
App. 1996) (emphasis added). The Wisconsin court recognized that there is a "notable
difference" between Wisconsin's statute and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (and thus also Utah's
Rule 23.1), which requires instead that a derivative plaintiff "represent the interests of
the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the
corporation." Id.
Because under Wisconsin law the court was required to find that the derivative
plaintiff adequately represented the corporation, and not any similarly situated
shareholders, the trial court dismissed the derivative action, stating that "[i]t is hard to
conceive of any way in which dissolution would be beneficial to the corporation in this
case." Id. at 772. And the appellate court affirmed, indicating that the result may have
been different under the federal rule (and thus also Utah's rule) by noting that "[ajlthough
a corporation's interests are not served by dissolution, a shareholder's interests might be."
Id.
As Angel explained in its opening Brief, the dissolution sought in this case could
serve the other XanGo members' interests in conjunction with the derivative claims. If
Angel succeeds on the derivative fiduciary duty claim, the Defendant will have to pay
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damages to XanGo and these damages would then be paid out to all members during the
"winding up" phase after dissolution.
The burden is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff is an inadequate
representative under Rule 23.1, LeVanger, 2003 UT App. 377 at ^f 18, and in this case the
Defendants have failed to show that there is an actual conflict of interest between Angel's
Derivative Suit and the direct claim for dissolution. All the Defendants have done is
point out that it is possible to have a conflict of interest between derivative claims and
direct claims for dissolution; the Defendants have completely failed to identify anything
specific about Angel's motivation in bringing the Direct Suit or about XanGo's
circumstances that would indicate any conflict exists. In fact, Defendants presented the
district court with only the unsupported allegation that Angel is pursuing the Derivative
Suit for the purpose of gaining leverage against XanGo in the Direct Suit, and as a result,
the district court refused to make a finding about Angel's motives. Brief of Appellant,
Addendum A at 9.
Because the district court did not, and could not, find that an actual conflict exists
between the Derivative Suit and the claim for dissolution in the Direct Suit, the court
erred in granting the motion to dismiss on this ground.
IV.

THERE ARE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS WHICH WOULD
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION REGARDING
ANGEL'S STANDING UNDER RULE 23.1
Contrary to Defendants' assertion, there are no alternative grounds which would

support the district court's determination regarding Angel's standing under Rule 23.1 or
which would be appropriate for this Court to consider on appeal. Defendants assert that
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there are other "outside entanglements" and "conflicts of interest" which the district court
could have considered, including (1) Angel's non-membership in Xango, (2) the fact that
Angel has not signed the operating agreement, and (3) the relatively small benefit that
would inure to Angel if the derivative claims were proven. Brief of Appellee at 37-39.
None of these factors would have supported the district court's decision, however, nor are
any of these factors appropriate justifications for affirming the district court on appeal.
First, Angel's alleged non-membership in XanGo is not an appropriate
consideration for this Court on appeal. The district court ruled from the bench in the
Direct Suit that there are factual issues regarding whether Angel is a member of XanGo,
and no additional evidence or argument was presented to the district court in the
Derivative Suit. The district court therefore made no finding as to Angel's membership
and expressly refused to grant the motion to dismiss based on the argument that Angel is
not a member of XanGo. Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 6. With no fact finding
below, this Court cannot use Angel's membership status as a grounds for affirming the
district court. LeVanger v. Highland Estates Properties Owners Assoc., 2003 UT App.
377, 80 P.3d 569, 574 n.5 (the appellate court is limited to the findings of fact made by
the trial court and may not find new facts or reweigh the evidence in light of new legal
theories or alternative grounds).
Second, the fact that Angel has not signed the operating agreement does not
support the district court's decision and is not a justification for affirming on appeal.
Although Angel admits that it has not signed the operating agreement, the district court
did not rely on this fact in making its determination that Angel lacks standing under Rule
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23.1. Defendants do not explain how this fact constitutes an "outside entanglement" or
"conflict of interest" which would support the district court's determination, or even why
this fact is relevant to the issue of whether Angel could be a fair and adequate
representative. All the Defendants offer by way of argument is the unsupported assertion
that Angel's "refusal to sign an operating agreement with XanGo is a factor to be
considered in this Court's determination." Brief of Appellee at 37. If anything, the fact
that Angel has not signed the operating agreement supports Angel's argument that it is a
legitimate class of one.
Finally, even assuming Angel's benefit from the derivative claims would be
relatively small, this fact does not support the district court's decision and is not a
justification for affirming on appeal. The cases upon which Defendants rely, G.A.
Enterprises, Inc. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc. and Rothenberg v. Security
Management Co., do not support the proposition that whether a proposed derivative
plaintiff is an adequate representative is determined based on this size of the plaintiffs
stake in the derivative action.
In G.A. Enterprises, for example, the court's holding was based not on the size of
the plaintiffs stake in the derivative action but on evidence indicating that the derivative
action would be used as leverage in other litigation. While it is true that the plaintiff in
that case owned less than 1 percent interest in the company and only $2 million was at
stake in the derivative action, this is not the reason the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of the derivative action. Instead, the court affirmed the dismissal because it concluded
that an "obvious conflict of interest" was created by the "wide-ranging" legal disputes
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between the defendant and the plaintiffs principal, and that plaintiffs stake in the
derivative action was outweighed by the magnitude of the principal's outside interests in
this other litigation. G.A. Enterprises, 517 F.2d 24, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1975) (commenting
that "[i]n these circumstances, the court could conclude that the dog might soon wag the
tail"). The court held that the plaintiffs (or at least the principal's) outside interests
suggested that the derivative suit would be used as a weapon, "to be either pursued, deemphasized, or settled as the future course of the larger claims might dictate." Id. at 26 .
Similarly, in Rothenberg, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the derivative
action not because of the size of the plaintiffs stake in the derivative action, but because
the proposed derivative plaintiff "lacked any understanding of the nature of the derivative
suit and displayed an unwillingness to learn." Rothenberg, 667 F.2d 958, 962 (11th Cir.
1982). While the plaintiff did hold only about 2% interest in the company and was
unlikely to receive anything from a damages award, the court was concerned about this
relatively small stake only because in that case, it resulted in the plaintiffs lack of
commitment to the action. Id. The court based its holding on the fact that throughout the
litigation, the plaintiff "remained unaware of the facts and issues involved in the
derivative suit" and even "acknowledged that her lack of personal knowledge made her
an inappropriate plaintiff to maintain the suit."6 Id.

6

Notably, the district court in Rothenberg had also been concerned about the
possibility of the derivative suit being used as leverage. The court determined that any
recovery in the derivative suit would "pale' in comparison to the possibility of recovery in
the suit the plaintiff had filed as an individual, and there existed a possibility that the
derivative suit would be used as leverage in order to obtain a favorable settlement in the
other actions. Rothenberg, 667 F.2d at 960. Following the dismissal of the derivative
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The situation here is entirely different from the situations in G.A. Enterprises and
Rothenberg. As discussed above, here the district court made no finding of an actual
conflict of interest such as the one that existed in G.A. Enterprises, and there is no
evidence indicating that Angel would use the Derivative Suit to gain leverage against
Xango in the Direct Suit. In fact, the district court rejected that argument below and
refused to make a finding regarding Angel's motives based solely on allegations of the
parties. Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 9. There is also no evidence indicating that
Angel lacks personal knowledge of or commitment to the Derivative Suit, as the plaintiff
did in Rothenberg. In fact, the district court specifically held that this factor was not in
dispute, explaining that "[n]either party asserts than an entity other than Plaintiff is the
driving force behind this litigation, nor does either party suggest that Plaintiff or
Plaintiffs attorneys are unfamiliar with this litigation." Brief of Appellant, Addendum A
at 8.
In the end, this argument concerning the size of Angel's stake in the Derivative
Suit simply illustrates that Defendants have it all wrong. The true beneficiary of a
derivative claim is the corporation, not the plaintiff, and thus the critical question is not
whether Angel would receive any benefit from the Derivative Suit, but whether XanGo
would benefit from the Derivative Suit. Because Angel is the only minority member
willing to represent XanGo in the derivative claims, and the only way XanGo can benefit

suit but before oral argument on the appeal, however, the district court directed a verdict
in favor of the defendants in the suit filed by the plaintiff as an individual. Id. at 961.
Thus, any danger that the derivative action would be used as leverage was eliminated, and
the Eleventh Circuit did not affirm on that ground. Id.
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from the derivative action and end the malfeasance that is occurring is if Angel is allowed
to proceed as plaintiff If the Derivative Suit is dismissed, XanGo would be left without a
remedy for the Defendants' alleged misconduct.
The district court erred in determining that Angel is not a fair and adequate
representative in the derivative action and committed reversible error in granting the
motion to dismiss on this ground.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the District Court's Order
granting Appellees' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).
DATED this 13th day of August, 2008.
WOOD CRAPO LLC
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Richard J. Armsttodg
Attorneys for Petitioners
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